A fatal airplane crash a decade ago prompted a life-saving fix across thousands of Boeing 737 cockpits. So why wasn’t the same lesson applied to the design of the 737 Max, an upgraded version on which 346 people died in recent disasters?
The 2009 crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 foreshadowed the risks of an automated flight-control system relying on data from a single sensor, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, the former director of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s Accident Investigation Division.
“Several parallels can be drawn,” Guzzetti said, including that each of the accidents involved a single-sensor failure and subsequent technical changes by Boeing that were eventually mandated by the FAA, he said.
And while the crashes have significant differences, the single-sensor lesson is one that Guzzetti says Boeing should have applied to the 737 Max.
Read the full story, "Boeing Max failed to apply safety lesson from deadly 2009 crash," at bloomberg.com.